Rapid public health response to a large-scale anthrax attack would reduce overall morbidity and mortality. Hovi'ever, there is uncertainty about the optimal cost-effective response strategy based on timing of intervention, public health resources, and critical care facilities. We conducted a decision analytic study to compare response strategies ro a theoretical large-scale anthrax attack on the Chicago metropolitan area beginning either Day 2 or Day 5 after the attack. ICU bed availability significandy reduces mortality for all response strategies. We conclude that postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination of all exposed people is the optimal co,st-effective response strategy for a large-scale aiithtax attack. Our findings support the US government's plan to provide antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination for all exposed people witliin 48 hours of the recognition of a large-scale anthrax attack. Future policies should consider expanding critical care capacity to allow for the rescue of more viaims.
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' I ^HE DELIBERATE SPREAD OF BacUlus atithracis spores is
A air ominous form of bioterrorism. ^'^ Although a largescale bioterrorist anthrax attack has yet to be perpetrated in the United States, studies by the World Health Organization and the US Congtess have estimated diat hundreds of thousands of victims could die from such an attack.""'^ In addition, the recently released Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism states that it is "more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013" and that the most probable agent would be anthrax.^''''''"''' Because clinical manifestations of inhalational anthrax progress quickly, rapid prophylaxis and treatment of people exposed to antJirax spores is crucial for limiting morbidity and mortality.^'''"' In tesponse to this challenge, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) proposed the goal of dispensing antibiotics and vaccinations to all exposed victims within 48 hours of the recognition of a large-scale anthrax artack.** Because of the lack of empirical information from actual large-scale anthrax attacks, both (]DC and the Institute of Medicine have recommended computational modeling and simidation studies to assess sevetal pubhc health tesponse strategies for mitigating the effects of an aiuhrax attack.''^" Prior modeling and simrdation studies have indicated that rapid response to an anthrax attack significantly reduces morbidity and mortality, with estim.ited effeas of various strategies dependent on model parameters and timing of the response.*' For example, Wein et al estimated that 1 kilogram of .anthrax spores released upwind of 11.5 million persons would result in 123,400 deaths if the pubhc health response begair on Day 2 after an attack, but the number of deaths would more than double if the response was delayed until Day 5.*' Odier studies ev<aluated the comparative cost-effectiveness of various response strategies and found important advantages in tesponding rapidly and combining postattack vaccination with antibiotic prophylaxis for aiithtax exposed victims.Unformnately, none of these prior studies simidtaneously evaluated the costs and effects of response strategies to a large-scale anthrax attack based on (1) timing of the public health intervention, (2) numbers of emergency staff and clinics needed for mass postexposure prophylaxis, and (3) the impact of available critical care facilities. Consequently, it is not clear how mass postexposure prophylaxis and critical care facilities should be used to develop the optimal cost-effective public health response strategy to a large-scile anthrax attack.
We conducted diis study to evaluate the compatative cost-effectiveness of time-varying public health response strategies for a large-scale aiirhrax attack petpetrated on the Chicago mettopolitan area. Four strategies were evaluated with tesponse beginning either Day 2 or Day 5 after an attack: (I) postattack antibiotic prophylaxis, (2) postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination, (3) preattack vaccination widi postattack antibiotic prophylaxis, and (4) preattack vaccination with postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination. We used the attack scenario of the Anthtax Modeling Working Group developed by researchers from Sandia National Laboratory to determine CDC's Strategic National Stockpile requirements.To enhance the validity of our findings, we simulated the effects of a theoretical latge-scale anthrax attack on an actual popidation and included specific numbers exposed to anthrax, current information on poptdation size and dynamics, available facilities for treating critically ill victims, and the numbers of emergency staff and clinics required to implement each public health response strategy.
METHODS

Sttidy Design and Markov Models
We used Markov decision analytic models to quantitatively estimate and compare the cost-effectiveness of various timevarying public health response sttategies to a large-scale anthrax attack on the Cliicago metropolitan area. Decision trees for die Markov models were created based on information from the following soufces: (1) a previously developed attack scenario, (2) an inhalational anthrax disease progtession model, and (3) mass postexposure prophylaxis models. These sources are described in detail below.
FoUowing the recommendations of the Panel on CostEffectiveness in Health Care, we adopted a societal petspective with 3% annual discoimt for outcome costs. We also incorporated a 1 % yearly probability of a large-scale anthrax attack with specific annual birth, death, inmigration, and out-migration rates pet year over 10 years.^' The analyses were conducted using TreeAge Pro 2005 (Williamstown, MA) and were based on best available evidence on model parameters (Table 1) .'^""^' Findings were expressed as costs in 2008 US dollars, lives saved, quality-.adjusted life-years (QALYs), and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) calculated as the incremental cose per QMY. The willingness-to-pay threshold was set at $100,000/QALY gained.
Attack Scenario
Scenario development is used by the Deparmient ofHealth and Himian Ser\dces (HFIS) to assess response strategies for potential bioterrorism attacks.^*^ To estimate the probabilities of morbidity and mortality based on various response strategies to a large-scale anthrax attack on the Chicago metropolitan area, we used the attack scenario of the Anthrax Modeling Working Group, which postulates an atmospheric dispersal of 1 kilogram of B. anthracis spores over a large metropolitan city exposing 1.39 million persons to various amounts of spores. The resultant model had the following parameters: (1) approximately lO''' spores are released with 50% dissemination efficiency, (2) a pfobit dose-response of 0.7, (3) a building protective factof Total hospitals  114  45  Total inpatient beds  32,806  45  Total intensive care unit beds  2,655  45 of 50, aiid (4) 85% of people ate indoors and inhale only 2% as many spores as the 15% of people outdoors. We also incorporated information on population dynamics and hospital facilities of the Chicago metropolitan area (ie. Cook, Dekalb, FJupage, Grimdy, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will comities in Illinois and Lake County, Indiana) to mote accurately estimate measures of morbidity, mortality, and costs (Table 1) .
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Disease Progression Model
We developed a mathematical disease transition state model using Mictosoft Excel Version 2003 software programming to estimate numbers of viaims progressing through discrete clinical states of inhalational anthrax at various time points after anthrax spore exposure.^''The disease progression and sensitivity analyses were constructed in Excel using standard logical operators. No macros or customized programming were used. The model also included st.T.tes for victims removed from disease progression because of insufficient spore inhalation, antibiotic prophylaxis, vaccination, or critical care. The disease progression model, with definitions and descriptions of the transition states, is presented in Figure 1 . Transitions along die states were determined by time course probabiUty estimates of ptogression or resolution of clinical manifestations of inhalational anthrax from published studies. This disease progression model also was the basis for the decision trees incorporated in our Markov model analyses.
Calculations assumed a large group of exposed people who inlialed sufficient spores ro cause progtession dirough the clinical disease states based on the availability of vaccination and antibiotic prophylaxis or treatment. Victims could progress only 1 state per day and could not return to a previous state. Tliis model is based on econometric methods of assessing cascade movement through tiered processes.^* For each disease state, the proportion of the victims KYRIACOU ET AL. progressmg to the next state was determined by probabilities selected to match disease progression estimates of the Andirax Modeling Working Group attack scenario.*""'^ Odier clinical manifestations of anthrax (eg, cutaneous anthrax) were not considered in our analyses because they do not occur as rapidly as inhalational anthrax and would nevertheless be treated widi antibiotics.
Chicago IVIetropolitan
The programmed model also assessed response strategies beginning any postattack day with changes in the probabilities of disease progression states (ie, infected, prodromal, fidminant, and dead) or resolution states (ie, cleared, recovered, or rescued), described in Figure 1 . For the infected and prodromal states, probabihty of resolution increased linearly as determined by input days to maximum efficacy of each response strategy. For all fulminant victims, the ptogrammed model limited access to critical care based on available intensive care unit (ICU) beds in the Chicago metropoUtan area and estimates of hospital preparedness and surge capacity/^^" Because no published information exists on ICU bed availability under the assumption of large-scale mass andirax attack circumstances, we assumed 50% of die 2,655 ICU beds in die Chicago metropolitan area would be available to provide critical care to fulminant victims based on our chnical and administrative experience. Remaining ICU beds would continue to provide critical care for patients with other serious medical conditions. After an attack, ICU beds would be filled widi inflows of only fulminant victims who would either be rescued or die in the following 2.5 days (estimated average duration of critical care). Newly available ICU beds woidd be immediately Bled by victims enteting the ftdminant state. If all ICU beds are filled, fulminant victims do not receive critical care and diey progress to death. Fidminant victims receiving critical care would be rescued based on the survival rate (58.,3%) of recent inhalational anthrax cases.' "' ' "^** Rescued ICU victims would then receive 10 days of non-ICU inpatient cate.
(3ur estimates of the number of ICU and non-ICU hospital days are less than those received by the inhalational a.nthrax victims from 2001 because we believe clinicians and administrators would hasten the movement of patients through limited healthcaie facilities in disaster situations where large numbers of victims would be awaiting critical care. We assumed that victims in die infected and prodromal states would not tequire hospitalization because these victims would require only oral antibiotics that could be administered in outpatient settings or at home. In addition, in a large-saile anthrax attack, it is unlikely hospitals could ptovide care for victims who coidd be cared for as outpatients.
Response Strategies
Four public health response strategies, corresponding to the policy options set forth by the Anthrax Modeling Working Group fbr a large-scale anthtax attack,'"*"'' were evaluated, for compatative cost-effectiveness: (1) postattack antibiotic prophylaxis of all exposed people, (2) postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination of all exposed people, (3) preattack vaccination of the Chicago metropolitan area popidation with postattack antibiotic prophylaxis of all exposed people, and (4) preattack vaccination of the Chicago metropolitan area population with postattack antibiotic ptophylaxis and vaccination ofall exposed people. We also evalimed the cost-eifectiveness of these response strategies beginning either on Day 2 (requiring 2 days to complete) or Day 5 (requiring 6 days to complete).
The 2 strategies with preattack vaccination used anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) given in a series of 3 doses by primary care physicians over a 6-nio.nth period followed by yearly booster inoculations fof 10 years. We assumed the pteattack vaccination program would cover 30% of the Chicago metropolitan area population and would be 92.5% effective (estimated from the only human field trial of anthtax vaccine effectiveness).Postattack antibiotic prophylaxis, vaccination, or both would be provided to all exposed people (including those infected ot clinically prodromal) by emergency dispensing clinics over a 2-day period Slatting on Day 2 or over a 6-day period starting on Day 5 to match calculations of Anthrax Modeling Working Group scenarios. Response strategies using vaccination also include a second postattack clinic visit after 2 weeks to revaccinate all exposed people.
As part of the Anthrax Modeling Working Group calculations, the postattack vaccination prograni employs 2 inoculations of AVA given to 100% of exposed viaims and was considered to be 90% effective in pteventing death if given before the development of fulminant inhalational andirax.'* The postattack antibiotic prophylaxis program employs 60 days of oral ciprcfloxacin to be dispensed to all exposed people. We assumed postattack antibiotic adherence would be 25% for 60 days, 25% for 45 days, 25% for 30 days, 15% for 15 days, and 10% for no days according to the Anthrax Modeling Working Group model.'"""'^ Notwithstanding this limited compUance, the costs for a 60-day supply of ciprofloxacin to be dispensed to all exposed people were included in the analyses. All victims in the fulminant stage at the time of available postattack ptophylaxis would not receive eidier antibiotics or vaccination, but would instead receive ICU care if available as described above.
Mass Prophylaxis Staff and Clinic Requirements
CDC plans for mass prophylaxis of all exposed victims from a large-scale andirax attack through the rapid dispensing of antibiotics and vaccinations using emergency point-of-dispensiiig (POD) clinics.**''"' Staff and number of POD clinics required to implement such a program can be estimated usmg computet simulations.^^ We estimated these numbeis for the 4 response strategies using the Bioterrorism and Epidemic Outbreak Model (DERM Version 2.0) software program developed by the Agency for Flealthcare Research and Quality (AFIRQ) and recommended by CDC to formulate tealistic mass antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination dispensing plans.'''''*''' BERM predias the number of staff and POD clinics needed to tespond to a major disease outbreak or bioterrorism attack on a given population based on specific input parameters. Our estimates incorporated paramerers on population size, duration of intervention, hours of POD clinic operation, number of work shifts per day, number of briefing and treatment rooms, room capacities, and lengdis of briefing and treatment. Postattack antibiotic prophylaxis, vaccination, or both would be provided to all noncritically ill (ie, exposed, infected, and prodromal) people over a 2-day period starting on Day 2 or a 6-day period starting on Day 5 aftet the attack. Fulminant and dead people were excluded from estimates requiring mass postexposure prophylaxis. The second postattack clinic visit woidd occur 2 KYRIACOU ET AL.
weeks after the first clinic visit, but the second vaccination dose would be given only to noncritically ill people over 6 days for both Day 2 and Day 5 response stiategies.
Antibiotic, Vaccination, and Medical Treatment Costs
Medical costs were estimated in 2008 US doUats and adjusted as needed using the medical care component of the Consmiier Price Index.^^ Hospital and ICU costs wete based on mean daily hospitalization costs for adidts, derived from the AHRQ Cost and Utilization Project-Nationwide Inpatient Sample."^' Outpatient visit costs were based on 2008 Medicare physician charges for an established patient visit using the Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) code 99214.^'* Costs for postexposure ciprofloxacin prophylaxis were based on Bayer's current average wholesale price.Vaccination dosage costs are $24.50 each for the initial 3-dose series and for the annual booster for 10 years."'"' Costs for POD staff for distribution of antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccmations were calculated at $14.20/ person-hour. A summary of all modeled costs is presented in Table 1 .
Vaccination Adverse Effects
Mild side effects from preattack vaccination were defined, as those treated with 1 physician visit in an outpatient setting; severe side effects were those treated widi inpatient care. The models assiuned that mild and severe vaccine side effects occurred in less than 0.05% of the population as estimated from reports of adverse events in the US military.'''' In a large-scale anthrax attack, it is unlikely that side effects from postattack antibiotic prophylaxis or vaccination would receive trearment in a healthcare system overwhelmed by the patients with inhalational anthtax. Therefore, assessments for postexposure antibiotic ptophylaxis and vaccination side effects were not Included in the models.
Quality-of-Life Adjustments
Short-term adjusmients in quality of life (QOL) were made for the mild side effects of preattack vaccination based on utilities reported for similar health states.''"'^ A quality-oflife adjustment was also made for patients with fulminant inhalational anthrax. Using published standardized estimates, we selected a value 1 standard deviation below the mean utiHty reported for acute illness to captute the impact on quality of life of having an illness with a high probability of fatality. "' Long-term adjustments were based on reports from inhalational anthrax survivors 1 year after their infection who reported a quality of Ufe that was 60% of the norm value.'^ Utility for the postfulminant inhalational anthrax state was estimated to be 0.6 and assumed in the b,ase-case analysis to persist at this level for a 10-year period. The QALY and ICER estimates included losses from the inhalational anthrax-related deaths but wete not ageadjusted.
Sensitivity Analyses
Sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess changes in the cost-effectiveness estimates by varying probabiUty of attacks, costs, utilities, side effects, ICU days, and hospital days. Monte Carlo simulations of 1,000 randomly selected observations were conducted by varying these vatiables simultaneously under the Day 2 and Day 5 response strategies to assess the sensitivity of the tesults over a range of possible parameter values. Uniform distributions were assumed for each variable. Cost-effectiveness acceptability curves were then constructed to calculate the percentages of simulated andirax attack tesponses that would be costeffective for preattack vaccination of the Chicago metropolitan area over a wilUngness to pay range of $0 to $300,000, using Monte Catlo simulations with annual probabilities of attack of die Chicago metropolitan area of 0.1%, 1%, and 10%.'^-'*^ We also estimated the effects of increasing the number of ICU beds available for treatment of fulminant cases on the number of deaths from inhalational anthrax fot the Day 2 and Day 5 postattack response strategies, hi addition, we compaied the effeas of varying the numbers of available ICU beds for the Day 2 and Day 5 postattack response strategies over a wide range of initial anthrax-infected viaims.
RESULTS
The base-case scenatio describes a large-saile bioterrorist anthrax attack on the Chicago metropolitan area population of 9,296,847, with a pubUc health response strategy that incorporates postattack antibiotic prophylaxis (without vaccination) of 1,390,000 exposed persons statting on Day 2 postattack and taking 2 days to complete (Figure 1 ). This scenario would result in 205,835 infected viaims, 35,049 victims developing fulminant inhalational anthrax, 28,612 deaths, and only 6,437 (18.5%) of die fulminant viaims rescued if 50% of the 2,655 ICU beds in the Chicago mettopohtan atea were available to provide critical aire. The number of rescued victims would increase only to 9,895 (28.2%) if 90% of ICU beds in the Chicago metropoUtan area were available.
Transition state morbidity and mortaUt)' estimates for aU 4 strategies are presented in Table 2 . Delaying initiation and completion of the pubUc health response from Day 2 (with 2 days to complete) to Day 5 (with 6 days to complete) would significantly increase overaU morbidity and mortality estimates for all 4 response strategies. However, including postattack vaccination with antibiotic prophylaxis of all 1.39 miUion exposed persons would significantly Note. Accack would resLilt in 1.39 million persons exposed among die Chicago mecropoliran area popuiarion of 9j296,847-Preattack vaccinadon would cover 30% of the population and would be 92.5% effective. Postattack antibiotic prophyl;rxis, vaccination, or both would be provided to ali exposed people by point-of~dispensing (POD) clinics over a 2-day period starting on Day 2 or over a 6-day period starting on Day S. Estimations also assume 50% ofthe 2,655 intensive care unit (ICU) beds in the Chicago metropolitan area would be available to provide critical care to fulminant victiEus. Note. Tlie fitsr postattack intervendon would provide antibiotic propliylaxis or ,intibiotic propliylaxis ,-jnd vaccination to all .surviving exposed victim.', by emergency point-ol-dispensing (POD) clinics over a 2-day period stardng on Day 2 or over a 6-day period starting on Day 5. Tiie second postattaclc intervention would occur 2 weeks later and provide only vaccinadons co all sun'iving exposed victims over a 6-day period. Tlie BiocerrorLsm an<t Epidemic Outbreak Model a.s.9umes 24-hour per day POD clinic operation, 2 12-iiour work shifts per day, 15% downtime, 10-minute briefing period for either antibiotic propliylaxis or v.iccination alone (20 minut&s in combinadon for bodi), and an average flow rate of 20 pauents per minute per POD clinic.
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reduce mortality estimates for all response strategies starring at either Day 2 or Day 5-We also estimated that motbidity and mortality wordd be lower for all response strategies if 30% of the Chicago metropolitan area population were vaccinated fot anthrax before a large-scale attack.
Estimates of staff and POD chnics required to implement the various tesponse strategies were based on the numbet of exposed victims who have yet to develop fulminant manifestations or die before public health interventions are initiated (Table 3) . Response strategies beginning on Day 2 woidd require significantly mote dispensing clinias than strategies beginning on Day 5 in order to provide mass postexposute prophylaxis to a similar number of victims over a shorter period (ie, 2 versus 6 days), hi addition, response strategies that include postattack vaccination of exposed people would require more staff person-hours because of the added time needed to provide vaccination with antibiotic prophylaxis during the first clinic visit and the necessity for a second clinic visit fot revaccination of these victims.
Cost-effeaiveness estimates calculated using Matkov models for the 4 response strategies begiiming either Day 2 or Day 5 are presented in Table 4 . We foimd that postattack antibiotic ptophylaxis is overall die least costly sttategy, but the addition of postattack vaccination of exposed people is cost-effective wlien begmi either on Day 2 ($182/ QALY) or Day 5 ($1,088/QALY) after an attack. We also found the addition of preattack vaccination in the response strategies was not cost-effeaive (ie, ICER>$100,000/ QALY), even with a plausible risk of a large-scale anthrax attack on die Chicago metropolitan area (1%/year over the 10-year study period). More specificaUy, we estimated that the addition of pteattack vaccination to postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination is cost-effective (ie, ICER<$100,000/QALY) only when the probability of attack is greater than 1.85%/year for Day 2 and greatet than 1.30%/year for Day 5 response strategies. Thus, delaying initiation of the response from Day 2 to Day 5 incteases the attfactiveness of adding die preattack vaccination component to the postattack antibiotic ptophylaxis and vaccination response strategy.
Ill genetal, our cost-effectiveness findings were not sensitive to one-way variations in the cost-effectiveness model paiameters (Table 5 ). An important exception was the markedly improved cost-effectiveness of including preattack vaccination in the response strategies w^ith increased probability of an attack. The cost-effectiveness acceptability curves in Figure 2 more clearly illustrate these effects. For the base-case 1% yearly probability of attack, including prea ttack vaccination widi postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination is only 7.0% hkely to be cost-effective at the $100,000/QAI.Y threshold for the Day 2 response strategy and 16.3% likely for the Day 5 tesponse strategy. Both of these probabihties increase slowly for increasing willingness to pay thresholds. At a 0.1% yeatly probability of attack, preattack vaccination is not cost-effective in nearly all simulations with either Day 2 or Day 5 response strategies. However, at 10% yearly probabihty of attack, including preattack vaccination is cost-effective for nearly all simulations with both Day 2 and Day 5 response strategies.
Sensitivity analyses of ICU bed availability indicated that increasing the number of available ICU beds in the Chicago metropolitan area from 50% to 90% of the total 2,655 existing ICU beds would increase the number of rescued fulminant victims only from 6,437 (18.5%) to 9,895 (28.2%) in the base-case scenario that includes only postattack antibiotic prophylaxis. Howevet, increasing available ICU beds from 0 to 10,000 would significantly decrease total deaths from inhalational anthrax for either the postattack antibiotics prophylaxis only ot postattack antibiotics prophylaxis with vaccination response strategies (Figure 3 ). Note, Dominitted implies other strategies are less costly and more effective and thu.s are eliminated from further considerarion in a cost-eifectiveness analysis. Extended dominated implies more effective strategies have lower incremental cost-effectiveness ratios. For ex,imple, increasing the ICU bed availability fi-om 1,000 to 10,000 beds ioi the Day 2 response strategy with postattack antibiotic prophylaxis woidd reduce inhalational anthrax deaths firom 29,867 to 14,604. This significant teduction in mottality was illustrated, fot both the Day 2 and. Day 5 response strategies. We also analyzed the effects of varying levels of ICU bed availability over a wide range (ie, 0 to 500,000) of initially infeaed cases of inhalation.al anthtax (Figute 4) on the number of deaths from anthrax for both Day 2 and Day 5 postattack response strategies. This analysis was conducted for 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 potentially available ICU beds in the Chicago metropolitan area. In general, delaying the response strategy from Day 2 to Day 5 significantly increases mottality regardless of the number of available ICU beds (ie, 1,000, 5,000, or 10,000 beds). Of particular note, increasing the numbef of available ICU beds to 10,000 for the Day 5 response strategy was not as effective as implementing the Day 2 response strategy with only 1,000 available ICU beds.
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DISCUSSION
Despite several studies illustrating the importance of rapid response to a large-scale anthrax attack, there is still uncertainty about the optimal cost-effective public health response strategy based on timing of die intervention and availability of critical care resources. Our findings indicate that postattack antibiotic prophylaxis ofall exposed victims would be the least costly response strategy fof a large-scale andirax attack on the Chicago metropolitan area, but
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Willingness to Pay per QALY Gained ($) Figure 2 . Cost-Efiectiveness Acceptability Curves for including preattack vaccination with postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination strategies based on day of response and probabilit)' of attack. For the base-case 1 % yearly probabiliry of attack, including preattack vaccination with postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination has a low probabilit)' of being cost-effective that slowly improves for bodi the Day 2 and Day 5 response strategies as the willingness-to-pay thresholds increase from $0 to $300,000 per QALY gained. At a 0.1% yearly probability of attack, preattack vaccination is not likely to be cost-effective at all wiUingness-to-pay thresholds for both Day 2 and Day 5 response strategies. However, at 10% yearly probabilit)' of attack, including preattack vaccination is likely to be cost-effective for nearly all willingne.ss-to-pay thresholds for both Day 2 and Day 5 response strategies. Bed Availability over a wide range (ie, 0 to 500,000) of initially infected cases of inhalational anthrax on the total irumber of deaths' from inhalational anthrax. These analyses were conducted for both the Day 2 and Day 5 response strategies using postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination with 1,000, 5,000, or 10,000 potentially available ICU beds in the Cliicago metropolitan area.
combining postattack vaccination with antibiotic prophylaxis saves significantly more lives and is cost-efFecrive fi)r both the .Day 2 and Day 5 response strategies. In addition, it seems that pteattack vaccination of the Cliicago metropolitan area is only cost-effective if the probabihty of an attack on this area is greater than 1% per year or if the public health response is significantly delayed after an attack. Out findings also indicate that only a limited number of fidminant anthrax victims could be rescued by the existing ICU beds, but that further reductions in the number of deaths cotdd be acliieved by expanding critical care capacity in the Chicago mettopolitan area or by transporting fulminant victims to healthcare facilities with available ICU beds outside the Cliicago metropolitan area. Flowever, increasing fhe number of available ICU beds has a modest effea in reducing mortality compared with implementing a more rapid response strategy.
Earlier studies evaluating the cost-effectiveness of response sttategies to an antlirax attack were limhed by (1) assuming relatively small exposed populations (eg, 100,000 exposed persons), (2) the use of simple cost and utility measures, or (3) not considering the option of vaccination We used the Anthnix Modefing Working Group attack scenario to extrapolate the cost-effectiveness of its 4 policy options. This scenario accomits for several factors affecting numbers of people exposed to anthrax spores, thus facifitating cost-effectiveness estimates based on timing of the pubhc health interventions. We enhanced the validity of our analyses by supplenientuig the Anthrax Modeling Working Group's polic>' options with several parameters from a real metropolitan population: (1) size and dynamics; (2) nunibets of victims progressing through the disease states of inhalational anthrax at various times; (3) numbeis of staff and POD clinics needed to distribute antibiotics and vaccinations; (4) available ICU facilities that could provide critical care to victims with fidminant inhalational anthrax; and (5) variable aists of preexposure and postexposure inhalational anthrax antibiotic prophylaxis, vaccination, and critical care for the 4 response sttategies.
Unlike many previous modeling and simulation studies, we did not assume that all people who developed fulminant inhalational anthrax would die. Instead, we assumed that KYRIACOU ET AL. some fiilminaiic victims would receive cfitical care and survive based on the case fatality tate of tecent cases in the j-jQ.^ygygj^ probable that only a limited nimiber of fulminant victims of a large-scale anthrax attack would teceive this type of care because individual hospital surge capacity for severely ill patients is limited.^^'^''' For example, on average tliete are only 17.7 mechanical ventilators and 28.9 critical cate beds per urban hospital in the US.^'' In addition, most hospitals (93.6%) have a surge capacity of fewer than 11 patients who woidd reqmre mechanical ventilation.Our analyses did not include initial tteatment in non-ICLT beds, because treatment of prodtomal victims would require only oral antibiotics that could be adniinistered in outpatient settings. Akhough non-ICU beds could be upgraded to provide some level of critical care, most fidminant victims would still need specialized medical care and invasive procedures to manage multiple organ complications; this care can be provided only by trained personnel with particular materials and eqiupment.
Policy Implications
Our findings indicate that postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination of all exposed people is the optimal costeffective pubhc health response strategy for a large-scale anthrax attack on the Chicago mettopolitan atea. The scientific rationale for this strategy is based on the pathophysiology of inhalational anthrax. In exposed people, B. anthracis spores are phagocytized by alveolar macrophages and tiansported to mediastinal lymph nodes.''^ Surviving spores germinate into vegetative pathogens that replicate rapidly and. release toxins that cause severe mediastinitis, septic shock, and death in a few days.
Because vaccination takes at least several days to induce immunity,''''''''^ immediate postexposure antibiotic prophylaxis is needed to ptevent toxin production by rapidly multiplying B. anthracis bacteria. Conversely, because B. anthracis spores can remain dormant in mediastinal lymph nodes for several months before complete clearance, vaccination enhances protection against delayed development of inhalational anthrax. Vaccination also reduces potential problems of noncompKance and adverse dmg events related to prolonged antibiotic treatment. For example, in a study involving people from the 6 US sites where B. anthracis exposures ocairred in 2001, overall adherence to the recommended 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis was only 44%.^" In addition, vaccination is especially important if the strain of B. anthracis used in an attack is developed to be resistant to cenain antibiotics to enliance its virulence. Furthermore, vaccination provides long-term protection from recurrent exposure to victims who remain in anthrax spore-contaminated areas.'^ Although no human smdies have directly compared the overall protective effects of antibiotic ptophylaxis versus vaccination, several experiments have found that rhesus monkeys receiving both antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination after exposure to andirax spores had significandy greater survival rates compared with either antibiotic prophylaxis or vaccination alone.^*''^' These primate studies were individually relatively small, but they support the policy of combining antibiotic prophylaxis with vaccination of all exposed people in response to a latge-scale anthtax attack. Becaiuse of these potential benefits, the FIHS Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) has endorsed CDC's using this combination for postexposure prophylaxis for people at risk for mhalational anthrax.^" From a societal perspective, the most effective strategy fot mitig.T.ting the effects of a large-scale anthrax attack would be to vaccinate a significant proportion of the general population before an attack. However, we fomid that a preattack vaccination program would be cost-effective only if there were a plausible risk for a large-scale attack or a significant delay in the public health intervention. In addition, our assumption that 30% of the Chicago metropolitan area population coidd be vaccinated before an attack may be too optimistic given the resistance of even liigh-risk populations to obtaining vaccinations against anthrax. ^ It is milikely that a significant proportion of the Chicago metropolitan area population would comply with recommendations for preexposure vaccination imless a threat of anthrax exposure was imminent or highly probable. In addition, ACIP does not recommend pteexposute vaccination fot the general public.**" However, certain people, such as healthcate workers and government employees, may benefit from preexposure prophylaxis to ensute performance of critical societal fimctions in an attack.
Cutrently, the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) stores medical suppUes to send to a major disease ourbreak anywhere in the United States within 12 hours. This stockpile contains large transportable "push packages" of antibiotics, antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, inttavenous supplies, airway maintenance supplies, and sutgical items."''^^ In addition, specific "vendor managed inventory" supplies can be shipped within 24 to 36 hours.^^ CDC has also developed the Cities Readiness Initiative prograni to prepare major metropolitan areas to respond to a large-scale biotettorist attack by dispensing antibiotics to their entire populations witliin 48 hours.** During a national emergency, state, local, and ptivate stocks of medical matetiel will be depleted quickly. State and local first responders and health officials can use the SNS to bolster their response to a national emergency, with a 12-liour push package, vendor managed inventory, or both, dependmg on the situation.'"^ Despite these efforts, the ability to dispense antibiotics or vaccinations to large popidations within 48 hours of a bioterrorist attack has not been empirically assessed and remains unknown. In addition, response strategies should include significant augmentation of the numbet of ICU beds and the personnel to provide critical care to latge nunibets of sevetely ill victims.''' However, our findings clearly indicate that expanding critical cate capacity is not as effective as instituting a more rapid public health
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intervention. Fot example, even increasing the number of available ICU beds to 10,000 for the Day 5 response sttategy was not as effective as implementing the Day 2 response sttategy with only 1,000 available ICU beds.
Limitations
Our analyses used multiple simulation models to incorporate the detailed and sophisticated costs and effects of various time-varying response strategies. The principal Hmitations of our study, thetefote, atise ftom potential misspecifications of key model parametets. To address these hmitations, we conducted sensitivity analyses by varying several parameters and found no important changes in out main residts except for those seen with increasing the probabiliry of attack. We did not, however, vary the number of viaims exposed to anthtax spores who would receive postexposure prophylaxis as tliis was specified in the ofiginal Anthrax Modeling Working Group model.
We also recognize that, durmg a large-scale anthrax attack, it would not be possible to accutately distinguish exposed viaims from unexposed victims, and the number of people requesting postexposure ptophylaxis could vary widely. Nevertheless, we deliberately excluded people widiout postattack exposure to andirax spores in the Cliicago metropolitan area for .3 teasons. First, we used the same number of people treated with postexposure prophylaxis as was specified in the original Anthrax ModeHng Working Group model for all our analyses. Second, increasing die number of people receiving postexposute ptophylaxis to include a large number of unexposed people would not significandy change our relative cost-effectiveness estimates ofthe response strategics or the interpretation of our findings. Last, we believe it is unlikely that policymakers would decide to expand die ptovision of postexposure prophylaxis to a large proportion of people who have exceedingly low risk of anthrax exposure as this would delay the delivery of critical resources to actual andiiax-exposed victims.
In addition, the Anthrax Modeling Working Group attack scenario assumed only 1 kilogram dispersal of anthrax spores. A larger dispersal would probably result in significandy more injured and dead viaims.Moreover, our analyses did not consider overall societal costs for recovering from a large-scale anthrax attack that could potentially dwarf healthcare costs. We also did not vary the percentage of ICU bed availability in our cost-effeaiveness sensitivity analyses because we found that few fidminant victims would be saved even if 90% of ICU beds were available. Furthermore, we did not accomit for additional morbidity and mortality from non-anthrax-related illnesses among patients unable to receive critical cate during the postattack period. Licluding these effeas in out analyses would probably widen the cost-effectiveness differences among the response strategies but not significantly change our findings. Finally, we did not assess potential variations in the eflFectiveness of either antibiotic prophylaxis or vaccination as these were detetmined by the Anthrax Modeling Working Group estimates.
CONCLUSIONS
Postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination of exposed people is die optimal cost-effeaive response strategy fot a large-scale bioterrorist antlir;3x attack on the Cliicago metropoUtan area. The addition of preattack vaccination to the response strategies does not seem to be cost-effective in most teasonable scenarios. Because of the insensitivity to variations in most model parameters, we believe our findings am be generahzed to other large US metropohtan areas. In addition, our findings support the US government's current plan to provide antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination of all exposed people within 48 hours of the recognition of a large-scale anthrax attack. These tteatment modahties should be supplied in sufficient quantities from the SNS to accommodate mass casualties. Even with a rapid response, however, only a limited number of fulminant victims could be rescued with available ICU facilities in the Chicago metropolitan area. Thus, ftuure policy considerations should include plans to significantly expand critical care capacity (in hospital and nonhospital settings) and potentially to ttanspott critically ill victims to healthcate facilities beyond the Chicago metropolitan area. Fortunately, a large-scale anthtax attack has yet to be perpetrated in the United States, but the lack of empitical knowledge limits certainty of cost-effectiveness compatisons of response strategies.
